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OPINION 
________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
The St. Croix Renaissance Group, L.L.L.P. 
(SCRG) sought leave under the Class Action Fairness 
Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), to appeal an order 
of the District Court of the Virgin Islands remanding a 
civil action to the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.  
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We granted SCRG’s request.  Because we conclude that 
the civil action here is not a removable “mass action” 
under CAFA, we will affirm the order of the District 
Court.   
I. 
In early 2012, “[m]ore than 500 individual 
plaintiffs” sued SCRG in the Superior Court of the Virgin 
Islands.  On February 2, 2012, SCRG removed the civil 
action to the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  SCRG, 
which was the only named defendant in the action, 
asserted that the civil action was a “mass action” under 
CAFA, making it removable under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332(d)(11)(A) and 1453(b).1
                                                 
1 CAFA defines a “mass action” as 
  Thereafter, 459 
any civil action (except a civil action within 
the scope of section 1711(2)) in which 
monetary relief claims of 100 or more 
persons are proposed to be tried jointly on 
the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve 
common questions of law or fact, except that 
jurisdiction shall exist only over those 
plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action 
satisfy the jurisdictional amount 
requirements under subsection (a). 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).  Section 1711(2) defines 
“class action” as any civil action filed under Federal Rule 
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plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (referred to for 
simplicity’s sake as “the complaint”).2
                                                                                                             
of Civil Procedure 23 or a state statute or rule authorizing 
a representative action.  28 U.S.C. § 1711(2).  Unlike a 
class action, a mass action has no representative or absent 
members because all plaintiffs in a mass action are 
named in the complaint and propose a joint trial of their 
claims.  A mass action is more akin to an opt-in than it is 
to a class action.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(establishing opt-in requirement for Fair Labor Standards 
Act claims). 
  Most of the 459 
2 We recognize that “[f]or jurisdictional purposes, our 
inquiry is limited to examining the case ‘as of the time it 
was filed in state court.’”  Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 
__ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013) (quoting Wis. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 390 (1998)).  
This would necessitate reviewing the initial complaint 
filed in the Superior Court.  That complaint is not in the 
record that the parties have submitted.  It was, however, 
part of the record submitted with the petition for 
permission to appeal.  Our review indicates that the 
allegations of the original complaint are substantively the 
same as the first amended complaint.  We have not 
attempted to further clarify the nature of the amendments 
at this late stage for several reasons.  First, this is an 
expedited appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2) that must 
be resolved within sixty days of the date the notice of 
appeal was filed, unless “for good cause shown and in the 
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plaintiffs were citizens of the United States Virgin 
Islands.  Several plaintiffs, however, were citizens of 
various states. 
SCRG purchased a former alumina refinery on the 
south shore of St. Croix in 2002.  The plaintiffs alleged 
that “[f]or about thirty years, an alumina refinery located 
near thousands of homes on the south shore of the island 
of St. Croix was owned and/or operated by a number of 
entities.”  According to the complaint, the “facility 
refined a red ore called bauxite into alumina, creating 
enormous mounds of the by-product, bauxite residue, red 
mud, or red dust.”   
From the beginning of the alumina 
refinery’s operations, hazardous materials, 
including chlorine, fluoride, TDS, 
aluminum, arsenic, molybdenum, selenium, 
as well as coal dust and other particulates 
were buried in the red mud, and the red mud 
was stored outdoors in open piles that at 
                                                                                                             
interests of justice,” an extension of no more than ten 
days is granted, id. § 1453(c)(3)(B).  Second, it appears 
from the record that the amendments to the original 
complaint were not substantive in nature and neither 
party contends otherwise.  Finally, the issue before us is 
legal in nature.  
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times were as high as approximately 120 
feet and covered up to 190 acres of land.   
In addition to these hazardous materials, friable asbestos 
was present.  All of the substances described were 
dispersed by wind and disseminated as a result of 
erosion.   
According to the plaintiffs, SCRG purchased the 
refinery site knowing that the loose bauxite and piles of 
red mud “had the propensity for particulate dispersion 
when exposed to wind” that would be “inhaled by 
[p]laintiffs, deposited onto [p]laintiffs’ persons, and real 
and personal properties, and deposited into the cisterns 
that are the primary source of potable water for many 
[p]laintiffs.”  Yet SCRG “did nothing to abate it, and 
instead, allowed the series of the continuous transactions 
to occur like an ongoing chemical spill.”  SCRG “failed 
to take proper measures to control those emissions[.]”  
With regard to the friable asbestos, the plaintiffs alleged 
that SCRG discovered its presence, concealed its 
existence, and did nothing to remove it from the 
premises.  The plaintiffs averred that the improper 
maintenance of the facility, inadequate storage and 
containment of the various hazardous substances, as well 
as failure to remediate the premises, caused them to 
sustain physical injuries, mental anguish, pain and 
suffering, medical expenses, damage to their property 
and possessions, loss of income and the capacity to earn 
income, and loss of the enjoyment of life.   
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The plaintiffs asserted six causes of action against 
SCRG:  
• Count I: Abnormally 
Dangerous Condition 
• Count II: Public Nuisance 
• Count III: Private Nuisance 
• Count IV: Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress 
• Count V: Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress 
• Count VI: Negligence.3
 
 
In addition to money damages, the plaintiffs sought 
injunctive relief to end the ongoing release of hazardous 
substances and to remediate the property.   
 
 In October of 2012, the plaintiffs moved to remand 
their civil action to the Superior Court, claiming that the 
District Court lacked federal subject-matter jurisdiction.  
The plaintiffs asserted that the removal had been 
improper because § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) excluded their 
action from the definition of “mass action.”  This section 
of CAFA excludes from “mass action[s]” 
                                                 
3 A seventh count is denominated “Punitive Damages.”  
This, however, is not a freestanding cause of action. 
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any civil action in which – (I) all of the 
claims in the action arise from an event or 
occurrence in the State in which the action 
was filed, and that allegedly resulted in 
injuries in that State or in States contiguous 
to that State.4
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  From the plaintiffs’ 
perspective, their civil action satisfied the criteria for this 
exclusion because “every operative incident occurred in 
St. Croix and caused injury and damages to the 
[p]laintiffs’ persons and property in St. Croix.”  Each 
plaintiff’s claim arose “from an event or occurrence in St. 
Croix” that happened “at a single location, the alumina 
refinery.”  In addition, the plaintiffs argued that their civil 
action had been improvidently removed because it 
qualified as a uniquely local controversy excepted from 
removal under § 1332(d)(4)(A) or (B).  
 
 SCRG opposed the motion to remand.  It argued 
that the plaintiffs had interpreted the statute to exclude 
from mass actions claims that arise in “one location” 
instead of as a result of “an event or occurrence” as set 
forth in the statute.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  
SCRG asserted that the exclusion for “an event or 
                                                 
4 Section 1332(e) specifies that the “word ‘States,’ as 
used in this section includes the Territories[.]”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(e).      
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occurrence” did not apply because it requires a single 
incident and the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that “there 
were multiple events and occurrences over many years.”  
It emphasized that the exclusion “requires that to avoid 
removal there had to have been just ‘an event or 
occurrence’—a ‘single’ event or occurrence.”   
On December 7, 2012, the District Court granted 
the plaintiffs’ motion to remand this action to the 
Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.  Abraham v. St. 
Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., No. 12-11, 2012 WL 
6098502 (D.V.I. Dec. 7, 2012).  The District Court 
considered several district court decisions that addressed 
whether an action qualified as a mass action.  It noted 
that the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged “continuing 
environmental damage,” and cited a statement from a 
Senate Report that the purpose of the “event or 
occurrence” exclusion was “‘to allow cases involving 
environmental torts such as a chemical spill to remain in 
state court.’”  Id. at *3 (quoting S. Rep. 109-14, at 44 
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 47 (2005)).  
The Court reasoned that  
[t]he word event . . . is not always confined 
to a discrete happening that occurs over a 
short time span such as a fire, explosion, 
hurricane or chemical spill.  For example, 
one can speak of the Civil War as a defining 
event in American history, even though it 
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took place over a four year period and 
involved many battles.  
Id.  The Court then declared that  
an event, as used in CAFA, encompasses a 
continuing tort which results in a regular or 
continuous release of toxic or hazardous 
chemicals, as allegedly is occurring here, 
and where there is no superseding 
occurrence or significant interruption that 
breaks the chain of causation.  A very 
narrow interpretation of the word event as 
advocated by SCRG would undermine the 
intent of Congress to allow the state or 
territorial courts to adjudicate claims 
involving truly localized environmental torts 
with localized injuries.  We see no reason to 
distinguish between a discrete happening, 
such as a chemical spill causing immediate 
environmental damage, and one of a 
continuing nature, such as is at issue here.  
The allegations in the amended complaint 
clearly fit within the meaning of an event as 
found in CAFA. 
 The plaintiffs’ amended complaint 
does not qualify as a mass action under 28 
U.S.C.§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) because all the 
claims arise from an event or occurrence, 
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that is, the continuous release of toxic 
substances from a single facility located in 
the Virgin Islands, where the resulting 
injuries are confined to the Virgin Islands. 
 
Id. at *3-4. 
 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), a party aggrieved 
by a district court’s ruling on a motion to remand may 
seek permission to appeal if the application is made “not 
more than 10 days after entry of the order.”  SCRG filed 
a timely petition.  We granted the petition on March 14, 
2013. 
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(11)(A) and 1453(b).  We granted 
leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(11)(A) and 
1453(c)(1).   
Under CAFA, § 1453(b) provides for the removal 
to federal district courts of class actions as defined in 
§ 1332(d)(1).  28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).  Consistent with 
federal practice, once an action has been removed under 
CAFA, the plaintiff may move to remand.  Id. § 1453(c) 
(applying 28 U.S.C. § 1447, which governs procedures 
after removal, to removal of class actions).  Under 
traditional federal practice, an order remanding a case to 
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state court is not reviewable.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  
CAFA, however, diverges from traditional federal 
practice by providing for discretionary appellate review 
of  “an order of a district court granting or denying a 
motion to remand a class action to the State court from 
which it was removed.”  28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) 
(emphasis added).   
Plaintiffs contend that we lack appellate 
jurisdiction under § 1453.  They assert that the provision 
in CAFA which permits an appeal of a remand order 
applies to only “class actions—not mass actions.”  They 
point out that § 1453 refers to class actions alone and 
does not use the term “mass actions.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1453(a) (specifying that for purposes of § 1453, “the 
term[] . . . ‘class action’ . . . shall have the meaning[] 
given such term[] under section 1332(d)(1)”).  According 
to plaintiffs, because their civil action does not meet the 
definition of a removable class action under § 1332(d)(1), 
we lack appellate jurisdiction.   
Plaintiffs’ argument fails to acknowledge a critical 
“deemer” provision in CAFA.  While § 1453 makes only 
certain “class actions” removable and does not use the 
term “mass action,” § 1332(d)(11)(A) states that “[f]or 
purposes of this subsection [(1332(d)] and section 1453, 
a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action 
removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it 
otherwise meets the provisions of those paragraphs.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A).  The plain text of this provision 
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makes § 1453’s treatment of “class actions” equally 
applicable to “mass actions.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(11)(A).  See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 
F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the “plain 
language” of § 1332(d)(11)(A) “makes it clear that any 
‘mass action’ is also considered a ‘class action’ for the 
purposes of CAFA’s removal provisions”).  And nothing 
limits that deeming provision to subsection (b), which 
permits removal.  Rather, § 1453’s applicability to “mass 
actions” includes subsection (c), which establishes our 
discretionary appellate jurisdiction over remand orders.  
Accordingly, we have appellate jurisdiction under 
§ 1453(c)(1).   
 
III. 
The issue in this case is one of statutory 
interpretation.5
                                                 
5 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. 
Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 151 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  De novo review also applies because whether 
the plaintiffs’ civil action fits within the mass-action 
exclusion in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) concerns the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the District Court.  Id.  The District 
Court’s application of law to the factual averments of the 
complaint is also subject to de novo review.  See In re 
Sch. Asbestos Litig., 56 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 1995).  
  We must determine the meaning of the 
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phrase “an event or occurrence” as it appears in the mass-
action exclusion.  The exclusion provides: 
(ii) . . . the term “mass action” shall not 
include any civil action in which – (I) all of 
the claims in the action arise from an event 
or occurrence in the State in which the 
action was filed, and that allegedly resulted 
in injuries in that State or in States 
contiguous to that State[.]”  
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).  “As 
in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the 
language of the statute.  The first step ‘is to determine 
whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular 
dispute in the case.’”  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 
U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).  “When the meaning of 
statutory text is plain, our inquiry is at an end.”  Roth v. 
Norfalco, L.L.C., 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011).  
If the text is “reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations,” it may be ambiguous.  Edwards v. A.H. 
Cornell and Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  As the 
Supreme Court instructed in AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. 
Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), when a 
statute appears to be ambiguous, we must  
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look to other portions of the [Act because 
s]tatutory interpretation focuses on “the 
language itself, the specific context in which 
that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson 
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
“A provision that may seem ambiguous in 
isolation is often clarified by the remainder 
of the statutory scheme . . . because only one 
of the permissible meanings produces a 
substantive effect that is compatible with the 
rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 
U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1754.  Only if we conclude 
that a statute is ambiguous, after consideration of the 
statutory scheme, may we then consider the legislative 
history or other extrinsic material—and then, only if it 
“shed[s] a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s 
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”  Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 
(2005) (emphasis added). 
 SCRG relies heavily on the article “an,” which 
precedes “event or occurrence,” and the singular nature 
of that article.  In SCRG’s view, this “an” before “event 
or occurrence” means that the exclusion is not applicable 
if the complaint alleges injuries that are not the result of a 
single, discrete incident.  In SCRG’s view, this means 
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that the exclusion does not apply to the plaintiffs’ claims, 
which are based on a series of incidents resulting in their 
continued exposure to the hazardous substances.  These 
incidents include the erosion of the red mud containing 
the various hazardous substances, the dispersion by wind 
of the same, and the improper storage of and the failure 
to remove all of these substances from the premises.   
SCRG’s argument is not completely devoid of 
merit. Its contention that this statutory language refers to 
a single incident is semantically consistent with 
Congress’s decision to use the singular form of the words 
“event” or “occurrence” in the exclusion.  See Dunn v. 
Endoscopy Ctr. of S. Nev., No. 2:11-CV-560, 2011 WL 
5509004, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2011) (noting that the 
statute did not state “events and occurrences,” and that 
the “use of the singular in the statutory language is 
important and sufficient”). 
But SCRG’s reliance on the article “an” does not 
end the inquiry.  We must determine what the phrase 
“event or occurrence” means.  “In the absence of a 
statutory definition” in the CAFA, we are bound to give 
the words used their “‘ordinary meaning.’”  United States 
v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256-57 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) 
(omitting internal quotation marks and citation)); see also 
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 
(1995) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined, we 
give them their ordinary meaning.”); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
 17 
 
U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (“In the absence of such a 
definition, we construe the statutory term in accordance 
with its ordinary or natural meaning.”).  In common 
parlance, neither the term “event” nor “occurrence” is 
used solely to refer to a specific incident that can be 
definitively limited to an ascertainable period of minutes, 
hours, or days.6
As the District Court explained, the “word event in 
our view is not always confined to a discrete happening 
that occurs over a short time span such as a fire, 
explosion, hurricane, or chemical spill.  For example, one 
can speak of the Civil War as a defining event in 
   
                                                 
6 The word “event” is defined, inter alia, as “something 
that takes place, especially a significant occurrence.”  
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 615 (5th ed. 2011).  See also Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 433 (11th ed. 2003) 
(including among its definitions of “event” “something 
that happens,” “occurrence,” and “a noteworthy 
happening”).  The definition of “occurrence,” not 
surprisingly, is “the action, fact, or instance of occurring . 
. . ‘something that takes place; an event or incident.”  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1219 (5th ed. 2011); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 858 (11th ed. 2003 (defining “occurrence” as 
“something that occurs . . . the action or instance of 
occurring”)).  
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American history, even though it took place over a four-
year period and involved many battles.”  Abraham, 2012 
WL 6098502, at * 3.  The Court’s construction of the 
word is consistent with the word’s common usage.  
Important events in history are not always limited to 
discrete incidents that happened at a specific and precise 
moment in time.   
As further support for this construction, we note 
that the plain text of the exclusion and the statutory 
scheme do not delimit the words “event or occurrence” to 
a specific incident with a fixed duration of time.  Because 
the words “event” and “occurrence” do not commonly or 
necessarily refer in every instance to what transpired at 
an isolated moment in time, there is no reason for us to 
conclude that Congress intended to limit the phrase 
“event or occurrence” in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) in this 
fashion.  Accordingly, where the record demonstrates 
circumstances that share some commonality and persist 
over a period of time, these can constitute “an event or 
occurrence” for purposes of the exclusion in § 
1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).   
In short, treating a continuing set of circumstances 
collectively as an “event or occurrence” for purposes of 
the mass-action exclusion is consistent with the ordinary 
usage of these words, which do not necessarily have a 
temporal limitation.  Giving the words “event” or 
“occurrence” their ordinary meaning is not at odds with 
the purpose of the statutory scheme of CAFA.  Congress 
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clearly contemplated that some mass actions are better 
suited to adjudication by the state courts in which they 
originated.  This intent is evident in both the “event or 
occurrence” exclusion for mass actions, as well as the 
local-controversy and home-state exceptions in 
§ 1332(d)(4)(A) and (B) for class actions.  See Kaufman 
v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(referring to § 1332(d)(4)(A) as the “local controversy 
exception” and subsection (B) as the “home-state” 
exception).  These provisions assure that aggregate 
actions with substantial ties to a particular state remain in 
the courts of that state.  
The local-controversy and home-state exceptions 
for class actions in § 1332(d)(4) and the “event or 
occurrence” exclusion for mass actions, however, are 
different creatures entirely.  Indeed, in light of the 
statutory structure of CAFA, the exceptions and the 
exclusion have to be different because a “mass action,” to 
be removable, must meet the provisions of § 1332(d)(2) 
through (10).  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A).  This means 
that to be removable a mass action must present 
something other than a uniquely local controversy that 
may not be removed under either the local-controversy or 
home-state exception in § 1332(d)(4)(A) and (B), 
respectively.  If the mass action complaint pleads neither 
a local-controversy nor a home-state cause of action 
under subsection (d)(4), it may be removed unless the 
 20 
 
“event or occurrence” exclusion in subsection 
(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) applies.   
It is notable that the local-controversy exception 
contains broad language instructing a district court to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction where the “principal 
injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related 
conduct . . . were incurred in the State in which the action 
was originally filed.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) 
(emphasis added).  The use of this broad language in the 
local-controversy exception for class actions and not in 
the mass-action exclusion might suggest that Congress 
intended to limit the mass-action exclusion to claims 
arising from a discrete incident.  See Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (observing that “where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
Because the local-controversy class action exception and 
the “event or occurrence” exclusion for mass actions are 
not the same, the broad language in the local-controversy 
exception in § 1332(d)(4)(A) for class actions does not 
control our interpretation of the phrase “event or 
occurrence” in the mass-action exclusion in § 
1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  Consequently, the statutory 
scheme of CAFA does not require limiting the 
 21 
 
construction of “event or occurrence” to something that 
happened at a discrete moment in time.  
 We conclude that the District Court did not err in 
its interpretation of the “event or occurrence” exclusion 
in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  Our broad reading of the 
words “event” and “occurrence” is consistent with their 
ordinary usage.7
                                                 
7 The ordinary meaning of the words “event” and 
“occurrence” do not easily lend themselves to fashioning 
a precise definition that can be applied to all litigation 
under CAFA.  It is sufficient for purposes of this appeal 
to determine that the phrase “event or occurrence” in the 
exclusion is not as temporally limited as SCRG contends.  
We note, however, that the exclusion contains other 
limitations, demanding a commonality of the claims and 
requiring a substantial link with the forum state.  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (providing that (1) “all” of 
the claims must arise from the event; (2) the event must 
happen in the state in which the action was filed; and (3) 
the plaintiffs’ injuries must have “allegedly resulted . . . 
in that state”).   
  Further, such a reading does not thwart 
Congress’s intent, which recognized that some aggregate 
actions are inherently local in nature and better suited to 
adjudication by a State court.  Accordingly, there is no 
reason to consider the legislative history of the CAFA to 
interpret the phrase “event or occurrence” in the mass-
action exclusion.  Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d 
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Cir. 2006) (noting that we “need not look to legislative 
history at all when the text of the statute is 
unambiguous”).8
 In light of our determination that the words 
“event” or “occurrence” in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) should 
be given their ordinary meaning, we turn to whether the 
plaintiffs’ complaint falls within this exclusion for mass 
actions.
  
9
                                                 
8 Although we need not consider legislative history, we 
doubt that the Senate Report would aid us in any way in 
interpreting this exclusion in CAFA.  The Senate Report 
was issued after CAFA was enacted.  See Bruesewitz v. 
Wyeth, L.L.C., __ U.S. __ 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081 (2011) 
(noting that “[p]ost-enactment legislative history (a 
contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory 
interpretation”).  In addition, because either party in this 
controversy can cite the Senate Report as authority for 
their respective interpretations, the Senate Report sheds 
little light on Congress’s true intent. See Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) 
(cautioning that legislative history has a role in statutory 
interpretation only if it “shed[s] a reliable light on the 
enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise 
ambiguous terms,” and instructing that legislative history 
is not a reliable source if it is contradictory).  
  We conclude that the complaint sufficiently 
9 We recognize that the District Court concluded that the 
word “event” in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) included the 
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alleges that all of the plaintiffs’ claims arise from “an 
event or occurrence” in the Virgin Islands where the 
action was filed and that allegedly resulted in injuries 
there.   
                                                                                                             
“continuous release of toxic or hazardous chemicals, as 
allegedly is occurring here, and where there is no 
superseding occurrence.”  Abraham, 2012 WL 6098502, 
at *3 (emphasis added).  In Allen v. Monsanto Co., No. 
3:09cv471, 2010 WL 8752873, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 
2010), the District Court used the term “interceding” in 
its analysis of whether the circumstances constituted “an 
event or occurrence” for purposes of the exclusion in 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  Id. (emphasis added).  It is clear 
from the text and structure of the CAFA that Congress 
drafted the statute with an awareness of the various types 
of aggregate action, including class actions, mass actions, 
and mass torts.  See generally 28 U.S.C. §  1332(d)(11) 
(defining “class action” for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction); id. § 1332(d)(11) (establishing the “mass 
action” as a non-class aggregate action and distinguishing 
it from mass tort actions that may be the subject of 
multidistrict litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1407).  Yet 
Congress neither used the word “tort” in the mass action 
exclusion nor the terms “interceding” or “superseding.”  
Because giving the terms in the exclusion their ordinary 
meaning does not create a result that is at odds with 
Congress’s intent to keep some actions in state court, we 
see no reason to utilize these terms of art in our analysis.   
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The complaint alleges circumstances that persisted 
over a fixed period of time–specifically, from 2002, 
when SCRG acquired the former alumina refinery, to the 
present.  These circumstances included: (1) the presence 
throughout the former refinery site of the red mud and 
the various hazardous substances that were buried 
therein; (2) the plaintiffs’ continual exposure to the red 
mud and its particulates as a result of erosion by wind 
and water; and (3) the persistent failure of SCRG to 
contain or abate the hazardous substances and to 
remediate the premises.  In short, the condition of the site 
during the period of SCRG’s ownership provided a 
source for the ongoing emission of the red mud and the 
hazardous substances and the subsequent dispersion onto 
the plaintiffs’ persons and their property.  We believe 
that these circumstances, which the District Court 
characterized as the “continuous release of toxic 
substances from a single facility located in the Virgin 
Islands,” constituted “an event or occurrence” for 
purposes of the mass-action exclusion.  Abraham, 2012 
WL 6098502, at *4.   
We recognize that multiple substances are alleged 
to have emanated from SCRG’s site.  But the complaint 
does not allow us to isolate a specific substance and trace 
it to a particular course of action taken by SCRG at a 
precise point in time.  Instead, the complaint alleges that 
the red mud containing the various hazardous substances 
was present throughout the site.  There are no averments 
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that SCRG removed any of the hazardous substances and 
thereby heightened the risk of exposure to any particular 
substance.  Nor are there any allegations that SCRG 
engaged in any manufacturing at the site to increase the 
emission of any particular substance.  There is simply the 
ongoing emission from the site of the red mud and its 
hazardous substances.  Because we cannot identify 
separate and discrete incidents causing the emission of 
the various substances at any precise point in time, we 
reject SCRG’s argument that the plaintiffs’ claims arose 
from multiple events or occurrences.10
We agree with the District Court that the complaint 
was not a removable mass action because “all of the 
claims in the action arose from an event or occurrence” 
that happened in the Virgin Islands and that resulted in 
injuries in the Virgin Islands.  Accordingly, the District 
   
                                                 
10 In addition to the dispersion of red mud, plaintiffs have 
also alleged that SCRG has failed to prevent the 
dispersion of friable asbestos.  Though these are two 
distinct hazardous substances, we do not believe this 
should alter the result.  Plaintiffs allege that both 
substances were present on the same site and have been 
released into the environment due to SCRG’s neglect of 
that site.  This commonality is enough for the release of 
the two substances to constitute “an event or occurrence” 
under the statute. 
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Court appropriately remanded the plaintiffs’ action to the 
Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.11
IV. 
   
 In sum, we agree with SCRG that the statute 
excludes from mass actions those civil actions in which 
all of the claims arise from a single event or occurrence 
in the state where the action was filed.  But the ordinary 
meaning of the words “event” and “occurrence” is not 
always limited to something that happened at a particular 
moment in time.  Indeed, “event” and “occurrence” admit 
of temporal flexibility.  For this reason, we find no error 
in the District Court’s conclusion that the “continuous 
release” of hazardous substances from SCRG’s premises 
constituted “an event or occurrence” for purposes of the 
mass-action exclusion in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).  We 
will affirm the District Court’s order granting the motion 
to remand.12
                                                 
11 Because plaintiffs’ complaint meets the criteria of the 
“event or occurrence” exclusion in 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I), we need not resolve whether the 
District Court erred by denying their request for 
discovery regarding SCRG’s citizenship.   
  
12 CAFA requires a court of appeals to “complete all 
action” on an appeal, “including rendering judgment not 
later than 60 days after the date on which such appeal 
was filed.”  28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2).  This means that 
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judgment must be filed no later than May 13, 2013.  
“[F]or good cause shown and in the interests of justice,” 
we may extend this filing date for ten days.  Id. 
§ 1453(c)(3)(B).  Because compliance with the 60 day 
deadline would result in an abbreviated circulation period 
for this precedential opinion, see Third Circuit I.O.P. 
§ 5.6, we conclude that good cause exists for an 
extension and that the ten-day extension is in the interest 
of justice.   
